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THE SEC'S NEW REGULATION FD: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
MICHAEL P. DALY
ROBERT A. DEL GIORNO
INTRODUCTION
After much controversy and ongoing debate, the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") formally adopted Regulation Fair
Disclosure (FD)l to prohibit the selective disclosure of material,
nonpublic information to analysts and major institutional
stockholders, among others, prior to releasing it to the public. 2
This rule, which became effective on October 23, 2000, bars
companies from revealing market-sensitive information to Wall
Street analysts and large shareholders without a simultaneous
release to the general public.3 Essentially, Regulation FD
I See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (2000) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249) (promulgating Regulation FD which prohibits
selective disclosure and insider tipping).
2 See M. Ridgeway Barker et al., Polcy Issue Alert: Regulation FD, POLY ISSUE
ALERTS, Oct. 2000, at 16 (stating that under Regulation FD companies are required to
disclose material nonpublic information to public soon after disclosure to stockholders);
see also McGregor McCane, Company Moving Firms Here: World Investor Link Plans
Webcast Center, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept.11, 2001, at C-1 (discussing
requirement of Regulation FD to release information to both analysts and public). See
generally Tom Sweeney, In Focus: Securities! M&A, NAT'L L.J., Feb.7, 2000, at B10
(commenting on Regulation FD prohibiting selective disclosure).
3 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (2000) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249) (promulgating disclosure of nonpublic
information by companies to public after release to "certain enumerated persons"); see
also Gary Filler & Stanley Cutler, Sento Corp. Cites Slowing Economy - Revises Its
Business Outlook, Bus. WIRE, Mar.16, 2001, available at http://www.businesswire.com
(explaining Regulation FD requires simultaneous disclosure of nonpublic information);
Sento Corporation Joins AT&T Program for Fast Growing Innovative Companies, PR
NEWSWIRE, Aug. 29, 2001, available at http://w-v.prnewswbie.com (stating Regulation
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represents the SEC's most recent attempt to "level the playing
field" for investors of all sizes by promoting full and fair
disclosure of material, nonpublic information.4
Although selective disclosure, if left unchecked, could lead
some investors to question fairness and integrity in the
marketplace, there are several that warrant more careful
consideration.5 This note examines the SEC's adoption of
Regulation FD. Part I of this note discusses the regulation and
its purpose. Part II examines judicial precedent and the SEC's
authority to adopt and enforce Regulation FD. Part III contrasts
several potential negative impacts of the regulation, including a
"chilling effect" on communications and the possibility of an
"information overload" for investors. Finally, the note proposes
that while Regulation FD's premise is quite noble, the regulation
became effective by creatively circumventing judicial precedent
and giving only limited treatment to several policy implications.
I. REGULATION FD
A. BACKGROUND
The maintenance of fair and honest markets is a fundamental
component of the federal securities laws.6 In an attempt to create
FD requires simultaneous disclosure by companies of nonpublic information).
4 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (2000) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249) (discussing need for Regulation FD to
promote equity in securities); see also Randall G. Ray, The Pros and Cons ofReguaton
FD, TEX. LAw., Apr. 30, 2001, at 43 (explaining Regulation FD intended to promote
fairness in securities); Robert N. Sobol, Regulation FD: Mandates on Managing
Disclosure, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 13, 2001, at 1 (commenting Regulation FD's
requirement of disclosure would "level the playing field among investors").
5 See John J. Egan III, Full Disclosure Apt to Backfire, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 15, 2000,
at C4 (explaining Regulation FD without direction could lead to lawsuits and decrease in
analyst research); George R. Kramer, Unintended Ills of the SEC Plan, NAT'L L.J., Apr.
10, 2000, at A23 (discussing possible unintended result of Regulation FD is issuers
making only bare minimum disclosure required by Regulation); see also John F. X. Peloso
& Ben A. Indek, Recent SEC Rule Proposals Come Under Attack, N.Y.L.J., June 15, 2000,
at 3 (commenting Regulation FD would result in less information being released).
6 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-229, at 91 (1975), quotedin Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.,
426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) (stating Securities Exchange Acts were enacted "to provide fair
and honest mechanisms for the pricing of securities [and] to assure that dealing in
securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among investors.. ."); see
also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975) (stating purpose of
Securities Exchange Acts was "to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such
exchanges and markets"); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 522 (1974) (stating
one of the "central purposes [of the Securities Exchange Act] is to protect investors
through the requirement of full disclosure by issuers of securities") (quoting Tcherepnin v.
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a more efficient marketplace for securities, 7 Congress established
a system of mandatory disclosure in the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.8 In spite of this system's framework, the federal
securities laws did not generally require that every important
corporate development be made public as soon as they occur. 9 In
practice, issuers maintained control over the precise timing of
many important corporate disclosures, as well as the audience
and forum.10 Thus, at a time when no commission filing was
immediately required, the issuer determined how and to whom to
make the initial disclosure. 1l As a result, issuers sometimes
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, c. 404, sec. 2, 48
Stat. 881 (1934); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590 (proposed
Dec. 20, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, and 249) (stating Regulation
FD will promote integrity in securities market).
7 See H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 11 (1934) (stating disclosure promotes efficiency due
to stabilization and protection of investors); see also S. Rep. No. 73-792, at 10-11, 19-20
(1934); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590 (proposed Dec.20,
1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, and 249) (explaining disclosure
promotes efficiency because analysts would not be only means of disseminating
information).
8 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590 (proposed Dec. 20,
1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, and 249) (defining Securities Act of
1934). See generally Hunter C. Blum, Comment, Esops' Fables: Leveraged ESOPS and
Their Effect on Managerial Slack, Employee Risk and Motivation in the Public
Corporation, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1539, 1550-51 (1997) (stating Securities Act of 1934
included mandatory disclosure of "financial information"); Henry L. "Scott" Nearing, III,
Note, Kahn v. Virginia Retirement System: The Impact of Rule lOb-5s Corporate
Disclosure Requirements on the Wiliams Act's Tender Offer and Best Price Rule, 40 VILL.
L. REV. 263, 263 (1995) (noting Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required mandatory
disclosure).
9 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590 (proposed Dec. 20,
1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, and 249) (noting periodic reports (i.e.
forms 10-K and 10-Q) call for disclosure of specified information on regular basis and
domestic issuers must report some types of events on form 8-K soon after they occur); see
also John P. Jennings, Regulation FD: SEC Reestablishes Enforcement Capabilities Over
Selective Disclosure, 32 ST. MARY'S L. J. 543, 547 (2001) (commenting that Regulation FD
requires disclosure within twenty-four hours or before next day of trading); Charles M.
Yablon & Jennifer Hill, Timing Disclosures to Maximize Performance-Based
Remuneration: A Case of Misaligned IncentivesZ 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 83, 93 (2000)
(explaining disclosure is not immediate but periodic).
10 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590 (proposed Dec.
20, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, and 249) (noting upon non-
intentional disclosure, public release of information must be "prompt"). See generally J.
Scott Colesanti, LL.M., Bouncing the Tightrope: The SEC Attacks Selective Disclosure,
but Provides Little Stability for Analysts, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 6 (2000) (explaining
vagueness in use of "prompt" and "simultaneously" in Regulation FD); Yablon & Hill,
supra note 9, at 93 (discussing ambiguity of timing provisions regarding disclosure in
Regulation FD).
11 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590 (proposed Dec.
20, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, and 249) (proposing terms
"prompt" and "simultaneously" as timing provisions, yet Regulation FD lacks definitions);
see also Colesanti, supra note 10, at 22-23 (arguing Regulation FD's lack of clarity leaves
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chose to disseminate information selectively before making broad
public disclosures.' 2
Traditionally, companies operating within the pre-Regulation
FD landscape met with major investment firms' analysts to
discuss information that could affect stock prices, such as sales
fluctuations, the release or announcement of a new product, or
imminent layoffs.13 With such advance warning, the firms and
their clients would be at an advantage to trade stocks before the
rest of the world learned of the information.14 For years the SEC
compared this practice of selective disclosure to "tipping" and
insider trading because it afforded an informational advantage to
analysts and institutional investors that was not afforded to
ordinary public investors.1 5 Regulation FD restricts corporations
from selectively disclosing such material nonpublic information
to analysts and large shareholders without also making a public
disclosure.16 The regulation, therefore, appears to provide the
ambiguity with regards to whom and when disclosure must be made); Anthony T. Horgan,
Comment, Regulation FD Provides Firm Footing on Selective Disclosure High Wire, 46
VILL. L. REV. 645, 661 (2001) (explaining Regulation FD is "flexible" regarding public
disclosure).
12 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590 (proposed Dec.
20, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, and 249) (promulgating public
disclosure as "simultaneously" and "prompt" without clarity in definitions). See generally
Maryann A. Waryjas & Louis M. Thompson, A New Millenium Dawns for Corporate
Disclosure, INSIGHTS, Feb. 2000, at 2 (noting Regulation FD lacks "brightline test" leaving
some lack of clarity); William Wright, Volatility Fears Over New SEC Rules, FINANCIAL
NEws, Oct. 23, 2000, at 2 (stating disciplinary proceedings will ensue if SEC can prove
intentional disclosure of information).
13 See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1278 n.420 (1999) (noting role of analysts
in companies future stock and earning potential); see also Stephanie Brenowitz, Analysts
Divided on Amount of Information New Rules Will Ofer, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 24,
2000, at 1D (discussing practice of companies to discuss financial information with
investment firms); Karen M. Kroll, Bridging the Fairness Divide, INDUSTRY WEEK, Oct.
2001, at 27 (suggesting analysts evaluate and "champion" company stock).
14 See Jennings, supra note 9, at 597 (explaining that prior to Regulation FD analysts
could be forewarned of "adverse information" by companies); see also Colleen E. Medill,
Stock Market Volatility and 401(K) Plans, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 469, 500 n.140 (2001)
(noting prior to Regulation FD analysts enjoyed "informational advantage"). See generally
Brenowitz, supra note 13, at ID (stating analysts used undisclosed information to benefit
clients).
15 See Paul B. Brountas, Jr., Note, Rule 10b-5 and Voluntary Corporate Disclosures to
Securities Analysts, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1517, 1520 (1992) (noting selective disclosure
could be viewed as "tipping"); see also Clay Richards, Comment, Selective Disclosure: "A
Fencing Match Conducted on a Tightrope" and Regulation FD - The SEC's Latest
Attempt to "Electrify the Tightrope", 70 MISS. L.J. 417, 420 (explaining the SEC viewed
selective disclosure similar to that of insider trading); See generally Barker et al., supra
note 2, at 16 (comparing selective disclosure to "tipping).
16 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,590 (noting
Regulation FD restriction on selective disclosure); see also Barker et al., supra note 2, at
[Vol. 16:457
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SEC with a powerful new enforcement tool for restricting the
practice of selective disclosure.' 7
B. SEC CONCERNS. FAIRNESS, INVESTOR CONFIDENCE,
AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The SEC and proponents of Regulation FD are primarily
concerned with fairness, investor confidence in the market, and
the conflict of interest that may exist in both analyst and
corporate official reporting.l 8 The SEC asserts that selective
disclosure gives analysts, their investment firms, and the firms'
clientele an unfair advantage in the marketplace because it
enables them to make a profit, prevent a loss, or acquire a more
precise understanding of a company's performance before the rest
of the general public.' 9 Regulation FD was designed to level the
playing field between professionals and ordinary public investors
with respect such critical information about securities. 20
Additionally, Regulation FD addresses the concern that
corporate officials may delay general public disclosure in order to
16 (commenting Regulation FD requires "prompt" disclosure of nonpublic information to
public and "professionals"); Richards, supra note 15, at 420-21 (stating need to prevent
selective disclosure to analyst prior to public announcement).
17 See Merritt B. Fox, The Privatization of Securities Laws: Regulation FD and
Foreign Issuers: Globalization's Strains and Opportunities, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 653, 654
(2001) (announcing Regulation FD is intended to stop selective disclosure); Jennings,
supra note 9, at 547 (noting Regulation FD requirement of fair disclosure limits selective
disclosure); Stephen A. Radin, Selective Disclosure After the SEC's Regulation FD,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 31, 2000, at 1 (commenting Regulation FD provides SEC with "a powerful
new enforcement tool" in combating selective disclosure).
18 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading from the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 65 FR 51716 (2000) (stating Regulation FD promotes fair disclosure);
Roberta S. Karmel, Insider Trading: Law, Policy and Theory after OYIagan, 20 CARDOZO
L. REV. 83, 111 (1998) (noting "prompt release of information promotes economic
efficiency"); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading
Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 453
(2001) (arguing "law governing insider trading should favor fairness over efficiency").
19 See Barker et al., supra note 2, at 16; Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65
Fed. Reg. 51,716 (2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) (calling selective
disclosures "unerodable informational advantages"); see also id. at 51731 ("The inevitable
effect of selective disclosure.., is that individual investors lose confidence in the integrity
of the markets because they perceive that certain market participants have an unfair
advantage.").
20 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (2000) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) (pointing out that investors rightly question whether
playing field is level when insiders use selective disclosure); see also J Colesanti, supra
note 10, at 28 (noting Regulation FD's goal was to completely level playing field for all
investors, including public investors); T. Andrew Eckstein, The SEC'S New Regulation
FD: A Return to the Parity Theory?, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1289, 1291 (2001) (discussing
intent of Regulation FD is to level the playing field).
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gain favor or bolster credibility with particular analysts or
institutional investors. 21 As a result, selective disclosure could
result in a potential conflict of interest because analysts may feel
pressured to report favorably about a company, or slant their
analysis in order to have continued access to such information.22
In promulgating Regulation FD, the SEC pointed to the market
benefits of having analysts independently research and analyze
information.23 In fact, the SEC cited reports indicating a trend
toward less independent research and analysis as a basis for
analyst advice, and a correspondingly greater dependence by
analysts on access to corporate insiders to provide guidance for
their earnings forecasts. 24 Under Regulation FD, analysts will no
longer be privy to company previews and will have to resort to
other means of gathering and disseminating information. 25
Moreover, the growth in technology has made it much easier
for issuers of securities to disseminate information more
broadly.26 Where issuers once may have had to rely on analysts
21 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (2000) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) (acknowledging management might use "material
information as a commodity to be used to gain or maintain favor with particular analysts
or investors"); see also JAMES HAMILTON & TED TRAUTMANN, FAIR DISCLOSURE AND
INSIDER TRADING REFORMS: REGULATION FD, RULE 10B5-1 AND 10B5-2 26 (2000);
Eckstein, supra note 20, at 1292.
22 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,717 ("[Alnalysts
have an incentive not to make negative statements about an issuer if they fear losing
their access to selectively disclosed information."); see also HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN,
supra note 21; Eckstein, supra note 20, at 1292 ("The fear is that analysts might feel
compelled to give a favorable report on a company to continue their prized access to
selectively disclosed information.").
23 See Dirks v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646, 658 n.17 (1983) ("Market
efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [analysts'] initiatives to ferret out and
analyze information... [benefiting] all investors."); see also Caroline F. Hayday,
Shedding Light on Wall Street: "y Reg. FD is Appropriate in the Information Age, 81
B.U.L. REV. 843, 846 (2001) (acknowledging there are market benefits of independent
research). See generally HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 21.
24 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721 ("One common
situation that raises special concerns about selective disclosure has been the practice of
securities analysts seeking "guidance" from issuers regarding earnings forecasts"); see
also HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 21. See generally Bruce Machmeier, Fair
Disclosure or Flawed Disclosure?; Regulation FD, the SECs Attempt to Promote Fair
Disclosure of Corporate Information to All Investors Might WellHave the Opposite Effect,
STAR TRIBUNE, at 3D (Oct. 23, 2000).
25 See Don Bauder, Fair Disclosure is Getting Its Chance to Sweep the Street, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, at H2 (Nov. 19, 2000) (arguing Regulation FD will actually force
analysts to do real investigations by "visiting Web sites, interviewing customers and
vendors and talking with retailers and dealers"); Machineier, supra note 24, at 3D; see
also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51716 (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240, 243, 249).
26 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,717 n.10
(explaining use of technology in security investments); see also Richards, supra note 15,
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to serve as information intermediaries, issuers now can use a
variety of methods to communicate directly with the
marketplace. 27 These methods include, among others, press
releases distributed through a widely-circulated news or wire
service, Internet web casting, and teleconferencing. 28 In the
SEC's opinion, technological limitations no longer afford issuers
the excuse that smaller investors are difficult to reach without
the use of intermediaries. 29
C SCOPE OF REGULA TION FD
The basic requirement of Regulation FD is that, "whenever a
company or a person acting on its behalf discloses material
nonpublic information to securities market professionals, or
holders of the issuer's securities who may well trade on the basis
of the information, the company must make public disclosure of
that same information simultaneously for intentional disclosures
and promptly for unintentional disclosures."30 In adopting this
rule, the SEC enumerated several key provisions regarding the
regulation, some of which are discussed below.
1. Scope of Communications, Issuers, and Issuer Personnel
Covered
Regulation FD addresses the problem of selective disclosure
made to those who would reasonably be expected to trade
securities on the basis of the information, or provide others with
at 436 n.91 ("[Blecause of the advancement in technology, issuers have the capability of
reaching a vast investor audience with their disclosures and therefore do not need to rely
on analysts to broadly disseminate the information."). See generally Eckstein, supra note
20, at 1297 (noting special guidelines "[in response to the growing availability of Internet
webcasting technology").
27 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,717 n.10 ("With
advances in information technology, most notably the Internet, information can be
communicated to shareholders directly and in real time, without the intervention of an
intermediary."); see also Colesanti, supra note 10, at 2, 23; Richards, supra note 15, at
436.
28 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (2000); Richards,
supra note 15, at 436 (stating issuers are no longer subject to technological limitations).
29 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716. See generally
Colesanti, supra note 10, at 2, 23 (examining technological aids available to investors);
Richards, supra note 15, at 436 (stating the SEC contemplated technology triumphing
over these problems).
30 HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 21, at 15; see also Horgan, supra note 11, at
658-59 (summarizing scope of Regulation FD); Colesanti, supra note 10, at 4-6 (discussing
background of Regulation FD).
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advice about securities trading.31 The rule applies to all issuers
with securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act
and those issuers required to file reports under section 15(d) of
the Exchange Act, including closed-end investment companies,
but excluding other investment companies, foreign governments,
or foreign private issuers. 32  Accordingly, Rule 100(a) of
Regulation FD enunciates that the rule against selective
disclosure applies only to disclosures made to the category of
persons enumerated in 100(b)(1).33 Further, Rule 100(b)(2)
contains four exclusions from coverage. 34 Additionally, the SEC
sheds light on the categories of disclosures by a person acting on
behalf of the issuer.35
a. SECURITIES MARKET PROFESSIONALS &
COMPANY SHAREHOLDERS
Absent a specified exclusion, Rule 100(b)(1) enumerates four
categories of persons to whom selective disclosure may not be
made.36 The first three categories include securities market
professionals, specifically: brokers-dealers, investment advisers
and certain institutional investment managers, and investment
31 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716.
32 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716; see also
Eckstein, supra note 20, at 1296.
33 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716; see also
Eckstein, supra note 20, at 1295 (citing Rule 100(b)(1)); See generally Colesanti, supra
note 10, at 4-6 (discussing requirements of Regulation FD).
34 See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(i)-(iv) (2000) (stating section shall not
apply to disclosure made to person owing fiduciary duty of trust, to person who expressly
agrees to keep disclosed information in confidence, to entity whose primary business is
issuance of credit ratings or in connection with securities offering registered under
Securities Act); see also Norwood P. Beveridge, Recent Developments In Corporate Law
and Practice, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 240, 276 (2000) (stating Rule 100(b)(2) creates
exclusion of four forms of communications); Horgan, supra note 11, at 658-59 (describing
four exceptions to Regulation FD enumerated in Rule 100(b)(2)).
35 See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a) (describing selective disclosure of nonpublic information
as intentional when person making disclosure knows, or is reckless in not knowing, such
information is material and nonpublic); see also Fox, supra note 17, at 655 (stating
Regulation FD requires issuer to simultaneously make information available to public
when selective disclosure is intentional, and promptly make information available to
public when selective disclosure is unintentional); Horgan, supra note 11, at 660
(explaining Regulation FD differentiates between intentional and unintentional
disclosures).
36 See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a); see also Fox, supra note 17, at 655 (stating Regulation
FD requires issuer to simultaneously disclose when selective disclosure is intentional, and
promptly disclose to public when selective disclosure is unintentional); Horgan, supra
note 11, at 660 (explaining Regulation FD differentiates between intentional and
inadvertent disclosures).
[Vol. 16:457
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companies, hedge funds, and affiliated persons.37 The fourth
category includes any holder of the issuer's securities, under
circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such
person would buy or sell securities on the basis of that
information. 38 As a whole, Rule 100(b)(1) covers "the types of
persons most likely to be the recipients of improper selective
disclosure, but should not cover persons who are engaged in
ordinary-course business communications with the issuer, or
interfere with disclosures to the media or communications to
government agencies."39
b. EXEMPT COMMUNICATIONS
The first two of the four exclusions from coverage exempts
communications made to either a person who owes the issuer a
duty of trust or confidence (i.e. a temporary insider such as an
attorney, investment banker, or accountant),40 or a person who
expressly agrees to maintain information (orally or in writing) in
confidence. 41 However, the temporary insider and
37 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719 (stating first
three categories of persons to whom selective disclosure may not be made, absent
specified exclusion, are securities market professionals); see also Jennings, supra note 9,
at 570 (discussing securities markets professionals); Richards, supra note 15, at 428
(noting Regulation FD prohibits companies from selectively disclosing material
information to analysts and institutional investors).
38 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719; see also
Jennings, supra note 9, at 570 (stating investment analysts, brokers-dealers and
investment companies are considered securities markets professionals). See generally
Richards, supra note 15, at 428.
39 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720; see also Colesanti,
supra note 10, at 7 (explaining ordinary course of business communications were
exempted in final version of Regulation FD at behest of commentators); Horgan, supra
note 11, at 655 (arguing Regulation FD is "not intended to include communications made
in the ordinary course of business"); Richards, supra note 15, at 432 (stating "regulation is
designed to address the core problem of selective disclosures made to those people who
will likely trade on such information").
40 See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(i) (2000) (stating public disclosure requirement does
not apply to disclosure made to person who owes duty of trust or confidence to issuer,
such as attorney, investment banker, or accountant); see also Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720 (describing attorneys, investments bankers, and
accountants as "temporary insiders" owing issuer duty of trust or confidence); Richards,
supra note 15, at 432 (stating Rule 100(b)(2) enumerates four exclusions from Regulation
FD coverage, "including disclosure made to 'temporary insiders'").
41 See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(ii) (2000) (stating public disclosure requirement does
not apply to disclosure made to person who expressly agrees to maintain disclosed
information in confidence); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at
51,720 (stating second exclusion of Rule (b)(2) exempts communications made to person
who has expressly agreed to maintain information in confidence); see also Beveridge,
supra note 34, at 276 (discussing four exclusions from Regulation FD enumerated in Rule
100(b)(2)).
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misappropriation theories of insider trading would still apply to
those excluded persons who trade on such information.42 The
third exclusion is for disclosure to an entity whose primary
business is the issuance of credit ratings, provided that the
information is disclosed solely for the purpose of developing a
credit rating and the entities ratings are publicly available.43 The
fourth excludes communications made in connection with most
offerings of securities registered under the Securities Act. 44
c. PERSONS ACTING ON ISSUER'S BEHALF
In order to clarify disclosures by a person acting on an issuer's
behalf, the SEC defined the term "person acting on behalf of an
issuer" as "any senior official of the issuer, or any other officer,
employee, or agent of an issuer who regularly communicates with
any of the persons described in rule 100(b)(1) or with the issuer's
securities holders."45 This definition was designed to ensure that
senior management, investor relations professionals and others
who regularly interact with securities market professionals or
securities holders were covered. 46 Furthermore, the definition
42 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720 (explaining
misuse of information disclosed to temporary insiders and persons expressly agreeing to
maintain disclosed information in confidence would be covered under temporary insider or
misappropriation theory of insider trading).
43 See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(iii) (2000) (stating public disclosure requirement does
not apply to disclosure made to entity whose primary business is issuance of credit
ratings provided information is disclosed solely for developing credit rating and entity's
credit ratings are available to public); see also Horgan, supra note 11, at 659 (describing
information disclosed to rating agencies in course of securities rating as exempt from
coverage of Regulation FD); Richards, supra note 15, at 432 (stating Rule 100(b)(2)
excludes from coverage disclosures made to "credit ratings entities").
44 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720; see also Marc
I. Steinberg, Insider Trading, Selective Disclosure, and Prompt Disclosure: A
Comparative Analysis, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 635, 651 (2001) (stating disclosure of
material nonpublic information by officer, director, employee or agent of issuer in breach
of duty of trust violates insider trading laws); Panel Discussion, The SEC's Regulation
FD, 6 FORDHAM J. CoRp. & FIN. L. 273, 280 (2001) (explaining breaches of confidentiality
agreements are governed by insider trading rules not Regulation FD).
45 See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c) (2000) (defining "person acting on behalf of an issuer" as
"any senior official of the issuer... or any other officer, employee, or agent of an issuer
who regularly communicates with any person described in §243.100(b)(i), (ii), or (iii) or
with holders of the issuer's securities"); see also Horgan, supra note 11, at 655 (arguing
rule addresses only employees whose responsibilities include interaction with securities
professionals and securities holders); Jennings, supra note 9, at 568 (stating Regulation
FD applies to persons permitted to communicate with financial community on behalf of
company).
46 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720 (stating
definition of "person acting on behalf of insider" was revised to allow regulation to cover
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states that a person who communicates material nonpublic
information in breach of a duty to the issuer would not be
considered to be acting on behalf of the issuer.47 Thus, an issuer
is not liable under FD for an employee's improper trading or
tipping.48
2. Materiality
Specifically, Regulation FD applies to disclosures of material,
nonpublic information regarding the issuer or its securities. 49
Rather than defining the terms "material" and "nonpublic," the
regulation relies on existing definitions established in case law.50
For example, information is somewhat ambiguously deemed
material if "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in making an
investment decision."51 This lack of clarity in a definition that is
essential to the regulation's operation may result in several
persons who interact with securities professionals or securities holders on regular basis);
see also Jennings, supra note 9, at 569 (stating senior officials cannot circumvent
Regulation FD by directing unauthorized persons to make selective disclosures on their
behalf); Richards, supra note 15, at 431-32 (stating issuer is responsible only for
disclosures of representative properly designated to speak to public, abating fear that
issuer could be automatically liable whenever employee improperly trades on material
nonpublic information).
47 See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c) (2000) (stating officer, employee, or agent of issuer who
discloses material nonpublic information in breach of duty of trust is not considered to be
acting on behalf of issuer); see also Colesanti, supra note 10, at 7 (noting person who
communicates material nonpublic information in breach of duty to issuer is not acting on
behalf of issuer); Jennings, supra note 9, at 569 (stating Regulation FD excludes
disclosures by individuals "in breach of duty of trust" to company).
48 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720 (2000) (stating
issuer is not responsible when one of its employees trades or tips improperly).
49 See 17 C.F.R. §243.100(a) (2000) (stating whenever issuer, or person acting on
behalf of issuer, discloses material nonpublic information regarding issuer or its
securities, issuer shall make public disclosure of such information); see also Horgan,
supra note 11, at 656 (stating obligations of Regulation FD apply only to disclosures of
material nonpublic information about issuer or its securities); Jennings, supra note 9, at
571 (explaining Regulation FD applies only to "nonpublic information is 'material,' as
defined by SEC").
50 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721 (stating
regulation relies on existing case law definitions of "material"); see also Jennings, supra
note 9, at 571 (stating regulation does not expressly define materiality but definitions
developed by case law control); Richards, supra note 15, at 429 (stating Regulation does
not define "material" but relies on judicially developed definitions).
51 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721. See, e.g., TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining fact omitted from
proxy statement as material if reasonable shareholder would consider omitted fact
important in deciding how to vote); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988)
(adopting TSCIndusti'es standard of materiality for Rule 10b-5 cases).
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unintended and negative effects.52
3. Intentional and Unintentional: Timing of Required Public
Disclosures
An integral aspect of Regulation FD is that the timing of
required public disclosure depends entirely on whether the issuer
has made an "intentional" or "unintentional" selective
disclosure.53 An "intentional" selective disclosure requires the
issuer to simultaneously disclose the same information to the
public.54 "Intentional" selective disclosure takes place when an
issuer (or person acting on its behalf) either knows or is reckless
in not knowing that the information being communicated is both
material and nonpublic. 55
Under Rule 100(a)(2), an issuer who makes an "unintentional"
disclosure of material, nonpublic information must promptly
disclose that information.56 "Promptly" is defined to mean "as
soon as reasonably practicable" (but no later than 24 hours,
unless the following day the market is closed, in which case the
52 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721 (stating many
believe unclear materiality standard will make issuer compliance difficult); see also
Jennings, supra note 9, at 598 (arguing company officials will hesitate to discuss issues
with analysts because materiality determination can only be made in hindsight);
Richards, supra note 15, at 435 (noting many fear Regulation FD will have adverse
impact on way public companies communicate with Wall Street analysts).
53 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722 (stating
timing of required public disclosure is dependent upon whether issuer has made
intentional or unintentional disclosure); see also, Horgan, supra note 11, at 660 (noting
Regulation FD differentiates between intentional and unintentional disclosures);
Jennings, supra note 9, at 573 (stating Regulation FD distinguishes between intentional
and unintentional disclosure of material, nonpublic information).
54 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722 (stating
intentional disclosure requires simultaneous public disclosure); see also Colesanti, supra
note 10, at 6 (noting "simultaneous" disclosure is not defined in Regulation FD);
Steinberg, supra note 44, at 649 (stating selective intentional disclosure by issuer must be
accompanied by simultaneous disclosure to public).
55 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722 (stating
intentional disclosure occurs when issuer making disclosure knows or is reckless in not
knowing that information is material and nonpublic); see also Richards, supra note 15, at
433 (noting private conference call with analysts and investors used to disclose material
nonpublic information may constitute intentional disclosure); Panel Discussion, supra
note 44, at 276 (stating intentional disclosure includes both knowing and reckless
disclosure).
56 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722 (stating
prompt public disclosure is required when issuer makes unintentional disclosure of
material nonpublic information); see also Jennings, supra note 9, at 574 (noting
unintentional disclosure constitutes negligence and often occurs during unscripted
discussions with Wall Street analysts); Richards, supra note 15, at 433 (stating
"inadvertent mistake" or "mistaken belief" information was public or immaterial would be
characterized as unintentional disclosure).
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outer limit for disclosure is before the next opening of the
market) after a senior official of the issuer learns of the
disclosure and knows (or is reckless in not knowing) that the
information disclosed was both material and nonpublic. 57
4. Public Disclosure
Regulation FD does not mandate the method of public
disclosure necessary for compliance. 58  Rather, it provides
flexibility to issuers in determining the most appropriate means
of disclosure. 59 Rule 101(e) states that issuers can make public
disclosure by filing or furnishing a form 8-K, or by disseminating
information "through another method (or combination of
methods) of disclosure that is reasonably designed to provide
broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the
public."6 0 In general, acceptable methods of public disclosure
include "press releases distributed through a widely-circulated
news or wire service, or announcements made through press
conferences or conference calls that interested members of the
public may attend or listen to either in person, by telephone
transmission, or by some other electronic transmission including
the use of the Internet."61 Regardless of the method chosen, an
57 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723 (stating outer
boundary of prompt public disclosure was modified to include later of twenty four hours or
commencement of next day's trading on NYSE); see also Colesanti, supra note 10, at 6
(explaining prompt disclosure is defined as "as soon as reasonably practicable" but not
longer than twenty-four hours); Jennings, supra note 9, at 574 (stating issuer who
unintentionally discloses material nonpublic information must make public disclosure
before later of twenty four hours or opening of next trading day).
58 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723 (stating Rule
101(e) defines types of "public disclosure" that will satisfy Regulation FD); see also
Colesanti, supra note 10, at 6 (noting public disclosure requirement can be satisfied by
several means); Richards, supra note 15, at 433 (stating Regulation FD requires issuer to
make public disclosure through one of several alternative means).
59 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723 (stating SEC
adopted modified definition of public disclosure to provide greatest amount of flexibility to
issuers); see also Colesanti, supra note 10, at 6 (recognizing Final Release of Regulation
FD loosened public disclosure requirement); Horgan, supra note 11, at 661 (stating
regulation takes flexible approach to what constitutes proper public disclosure).
60 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723; see also Colesanti,
supra note 10, at 6-7 (noting method of public disclosure must be reasonably calculated to
make broad public disclosure); Jennings, supra note 9, at 576 (noting SEC's emphasis on
public disclosure being made in non-exclusionary manner).
61 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723-24; see also
HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 21, at 26 (commenting that although posting of
information on company's web site by itself is not sufficient means of public disclosure,
SEC recognizes that issuer web sites can be major component of effective public disclosure
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issuer must provide the public with adequate notice of the
conference or call, as well as the means for accessing it.62
5. Liability Issues
Significantly, Regulation FD is not an antifraud rule and does
not create new duties under either the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws or in private rights of action.6 3 In fact,
Rule 102 expressly provides that a failure to make a public
disclosure required solely by Regulation FD shall not be deemed
a violation of Rule 10(b)-5.64 Accordingly, private plaintiffs
cannot rely on a Regulation FD violation as a basis for a private
action alleging Rule 10(b)-5 violations by an issuer.65
Furthermore, Regulation FD does not affect any existing grounds
for liability under rule 10(b)-5.66 For example, liability for
"tipping" and insider trading under rule 10(b)-5 may still exist if
a selective disclosure is made in circumstances that meet the
process in future); Jennings, supra note 9, at 576 (stating SEC recognizes and suggests
most companies utilize Internet as part of public communication strategy).
62 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723 (suggesting
Internet and conference calls may be used to provide public with broad access to issuer
disclosure events); see also Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Regulation FD: New
Rules for Selective Disclosure, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 2000, at 5 (recommending press releases
issued several days before conference call to inform investors of time, date and means of
accessing conference call). But see Ellen L. Rosen, SEC's Fair Disclosure Rules Vex the
Financial Community, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 23, 2000, at 1 (noting lawyers are concerned
postings on corporate web sites will not satisfy Regulation FD requirements).
63 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726; see also
Horgan, supra note 11, at 663 (stating Regulation FD does not create duties under
ntifraud provisions of federal securities laws or create private rights of action against
issuers); Jennings, supra note 9, at 576 (stating SEC enforces Regulation FD through
several forms of judicial action because regulation does not create private cause of action).
64 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726 (stating Rule
102 is meant to exclude liability under Rule 10b-5 for cases based only on failure to make
public disclosure required by regulation); see also HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note
21, at 31 (stating Rule 102 expressly provides failure to make public disclosure will not be
considered violation of Rule 10b-5); Jennings, supra note 9, at 580 (noting violation of
Regulation FD does not constitute per se violation of Rule l0b-5).
65 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726 (explaining
private plaintiffs cannot rely on issuer's violation of Regulation FD as basis for private
action alleging Rule 10b-5 violations); see also HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 21,
at 31 (stating private plaintiffs cannot rely on violation of Regulation FD as basis for Rule
10b-5 action because Regulation FD does not create new duty for purposes of Rule l0b-5
liability); Richards, supra note 15, at 434 (stating because Regulation FD is issuer
disclosure rule, no private liability arises from issuer's failure to make proper disclosure).
66 See SEC, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726
(clarifying Rule 102 is designed to exclude Rule lOb-5 liability for cases based on failure to
make Regulation FD public disclosure); see also HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 21,
at 32 (2000) (recognizing Rule 102 does not provide protection from Rule lob-5 liability);
Richards, supra note 15, at 434 (noting Regulation FD does not purport to change or
undermine traditional bases for Rule 10b-5 liability).
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Dirks v. SEC57 "personal benefit" test.68 In addition, if an issuer's
report or public disclosure made under Regulation FD contains
either false or misleading information, or omitted material
information, Rule 102 will not provide protection from rule 10(b)-
5 liability.69
Consequently, if an issuer fails to comply with Regulation FD,
that issuer would be subject only to an SEC enforcement action
alleging violations of section 13(a) or 15(b) of the Exchange Act
and Regulation FD.70 Further, the SEC can bring an
administrative action seeking a cease-and-desist order, or a civil
action for an injunction and/or money penalties.71 In appropriate
cases, the SEC could also bring an enforcement action against
the disclosing individual responsible for a violation either as a
"cause of" the violation in a cease-and-desist proceeding, or as an
aider and abettor of the violation in an injunctive action.72
II. EXAMINING JUDICIAL PRECEDENT AND THE SEC'S
AUTHORITY TO ENACT REGULATION FD
Prior to Regulation FD's promulgation, the SEC had sought to
67 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
68 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726 (recognizing
liability for tipping exists under personal benefit test); see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663
(stating inquiry into "whether the insider receives a direct or personal benefit from the
disclosure" helps courts determine breach of duty); HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note
21, at 12 (2000) (noting "personal benefit test" supplies court with objective criteria in
determining whether there has been breach of duty by insider).
69 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726 (recognizing
Rule 102 does not protect from Rule 10b-5 liability if false or misleading information is
contained in issuers report); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196
(1975) (explaining it is well established that private cause of action under Rule 10b-5
exists despite lack of express private remedy); HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 21,
at 32 (2000) (indicating instances where Rule lOb-5 liability cannot be avoided).
70 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726 (discussing
liability issues surrounding Regulation FD); see also Scott J. Davis, Liabih'ty Under
Sections 10, 18 and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of1934, 1198 PLI/Corp. 723, 781-82
(2000) (recognizing Regulation FD only creates duties under §13 and §15 of Exchange
Act); HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 21, at 26 (2000) (noting instances where issuer
would be subject to SEC enforcement action).
71 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726 (discussing
enforcement options SEC has with respect to Regulation FD); see also 15 U.S.C. §
78(u)(d)(1) (2001) (permitting SEC to bring action in order to enjoin acts that appear to be
in violation of Exchange Act); HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 21, at 26 (2000)
(noting power of SEC to bring administrative or civil action against issuer).
72 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726 (discussing
enforcement options SEC has with respect to Regulation FD); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78(t)
(2001) (noting liability of persons who aid and abet violations); 15 U.S.C. § 78(u) (2001)
(delineating circumstances under which SEC may order issuer to cease to violate
Exchange Act and require issuer "to take steps to effect compliance").
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combat selective disclosure by analogizing the practice to the
"tipping" liability found in insider trading law.73 These early
attempts to curtail selective disclosure relied on both Rule 10(b)
liability and the "parity of information" theory. 74 However, as
discussed below, the Supreme Court clearly rejected the parity of
information theory of liability, thus making it more difficult for
the SEC to successfully combat selective disclosure. In an
apparent attempt to avoid language found in several Supreme
Court decisions, the SEC creatively adopted Regulation FD
under the provisions of sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the 1934
Exchange Act.
A. Judicial Treatment of the "Parity of Information" Theory
1. High-Water Mark for the "Parity of Information" Theory
Under early insider trading case law, selective disclosure of
material information to securities analysts could lead to liability
because courts adhered to the principle that traders should have
equal access to corporate information.75 In Cady, Roberts & Co.,76
the SEC extended liability for insider trading on a theory of
"parity of information," which is based on the notion that all
investors should enjoy equal access to information. 77 In SEC v.
73 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding that
defendant employees violated Rule 10(b)-5(3) and Section 10(b) by divulging undisclosed
information); see also In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (holding
individuals other than corporate insiders could be obligated to either disclose material
nonpublic information before trading or abstain from trading altogether); Richards, supra
note 15, at 420 (discussing briefly SEC's evaluation of selective disclosure prior to
Regulation FD).
74 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,727; see also Glen
Banks, The SEC Puts the Weight on the Other Side, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 29, 2000, at 1
(discussing cases dealing with insider trading that were decided prior to Regulation FD);
Roberta S. Karmel, Avoiding Precedents By Adopting Insider Trading Rules, N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 21, 2000, at 3 (discussing prior case law reliance on parity of information theory).
75 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,727 (discussing
early insider trading case law liability); see also Banks, supra note 74, at 1 (recognizing
principle of equal access to corporate information); Karmel, supra note 74, at 3 (stating all
investors should enjoy equal access to information, however, recognizing theory is too
broad).
76 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
77 See Malcolm A. Tripp, Access, Efficiency, and Fairness in Dirks v. SEC, 60 IND.
L.J. 535, 539 (1984) (providing more detailed analysis of In re Cady, Roberts); see also
Banks, supra note 74, at 1 (citing Texas Gulffor proposition that "all investors trading on
impersonal exchanges [should] have equal access to material information"); Karmel,
supra note 74, at 3 (discussing Cady, Roberts & Co).
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Texas Gulf SuIpher Co., 78 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit adopted the rationale of Cady Roberts and ruled that
Rule 10(b)-5 "is based in policy on [the] justifiable expectation of
the securities market place that all investors trading on
impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material
information."79 The court held that a person possessing material,
nonpublic information may not trade on it if they know that it is
unavailable to others.SO This prohibition applied to any person,
not just insiders,8' and courts consistently reiterated this point
over the next decade.8 2 The holding in Texas Gulfrepresents the
high-water mark for the prohibition of insider trading because it
utilized both an inherent fairness argument,8 3 as well as the
Cady, Roberts formulation of "disclose or abstain."8 4 Under such
78 401 F.2d 833 (1968).
79 Texas Gul, 401 F.2d at 848 (extending liability to corporate officers and employees
who traded on undisclosed information regarding successful result of mining operations);
see also Banks, supra note 74, at 1 (discussing implications of Texas Gulf); Michael H.
Dessent, Joe Six-Pack, United States v. O'Hagan, and Private Securities Litigation: A
Line Must Be Drawn, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1137, 1161 (1998) (citing Texas Gulf for
proposition that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges should have equal access
to information).
80 See Texas Gul,, 401 F.2d at 848 (applying "disclose or refrain" rule by which
corporate insider must either disclose all material information to public or refrain from
trading until information becomes public); see also Banks, supra note 74, at 1
(announcing holding in Texas Gub9; Dessent, supra note 79, at 1160 (discussing holding
in Texas GuM.
81 See Texas Gul, 401 F.2d at 848 (noting Rule 10b-5 "is also applicable to one
possessing information who may not be strictly termed an 'insider' within the meaning of
Sec. 16(b) of the Act"); see also Cady, Roberts &Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912 (recognizing insiders
are not only class of persons who cannot disclose nonpublic information); Banks, supra
note 74, at 1 (noting "[alnyone - corporate insider or not - who regularly receives material
nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securities without
incurring an affirmative duty to disclose.").
82 See Banks, supra note 74, at 1, n.l (recognizing courts have applied Texas Gulf
holding consistently); see also; Dessent, supra note 79, at 1160 (recognizing Texas Gulf
was starting point for modem evolution of insider trading laws); Tripp, supra note 77, at
548 (discussing relationship between fiduciary duty and access to information).
83 See Texas Gulf, 401 F.2d at 847-48 (stating 10b-5 was designed "to insure fairness
in securities transactions" through disclosure by "anyone" possessing inside information
and not just corporate managers); see also Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fiduciaries,
Misappropriators and the Murky Outlines of the Den of Tieves: A Conceptual
Continuum for Analyzing United States v. O'Hagan, 33 TULSA L.J. 163, 169 (1997)
(asserting Texas Gulf Sulpher Co. was decided based on "parity of information" theory);
Lynn L. White, Recent Development: Securities Regulations - The Disclose or Abstain
Rule -Y ppee Liabiity, 51 TENN. L. REV. 359, 365 (1984) (asserting Texas GulfSulpher
Co. was decided based on "perceived" policy of level playing field).
84 Texas Gull 401 F.2d at 848 (concluding from Cady, Roberts & Co., "[alnyone in
possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing
public.., or [il] he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in... the securities
concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed."); see also Cady, Roberts &
Co.,40 S.E.C. at 911 (explaining that to avoid liability where disclosure is not possible
simply "keep out of the market"); Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of
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a broad reading of insider trading laws, the practice of selective
disclosure was effectively prohibited.85 However, the Supreme
Court had not yet ruled on this issue.
2. Supreme Court's Express Rejection of the "Parity of
Information" Theory
The Supreme Court decisions in Chiarella v. US.86 and Dirks
v. SECB7 significantly narrowed the landscape of 10(b)-5
liability.88 In Chiarela, the Court explicitly rejected the parity of
information approach holding that there must be a breach of a
fiduciary duty or other special relationship of trust and
confidence before the law imposes a duty to disclose or abstain
from trading.89 Further, the Court stated that the adoption of
such a broad formulation for liability "should not be undertaken
absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent."90
Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK_ L. REV. 763, 820 (1995) (describing "disclose or abstain"
rule from Texas Gul).
85 See Colesanti, supra note 10, 8-9 (stating few selective disclosure cases have been
brought after Dirks, thus implying that under old Texas Gulfstandard more cases would
be prosecuted); Richards, supra note 15, at 420 (stating selective disclosure was insider
trading under traditional case law).
86 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
87 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
88 See Dessent, supra note 79, at 1172 (stating 10b-5 is limited to those with fiduciary
duties after Chiarella and Dirks); see also Karmel, supra note 74, at 3 (asserting
Cluarella narrowed scope of 10b-5); Ellen Taylor, Teaching an Old Law New Tricks:
Rethinking Section 16, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1315, 1331 (1997) (describing gap in 10b-5
prohibitions after Chiarella and Dirks as narrowing liability); Joseph J. Urgese, Note,
United States v. O'Hagan: Rule 10b-5, the "Judicial Oak Wh'ch Has Grown From Little
More Than a Legislative Acorn," and the Antifraud Legislation of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 31 AKRON L. REV. 431, 438 (1998) (noting Court's reluctance in
Chiarella and Dirks to expand acts deemed manipulative).
89 See Cliaerella, 445 U.S. at 233 (stating violation of 10b-5 arises from duties owed
between parties and not from parity-of-information rule); see also Dirks 463 U.S. at 654-
55 (discussing rejection in Chiarella of liability based on parity of information and instead
adopting liability based on special relationships giving rise to duty to disclose); Richard J.
Hunter, Jr. & Anthony L. Loviscek, Insider Trading Since Carpenter: The
Misappropriation Theory and Beyond, 41 HOW. L.J. 79, 82 (1997) (noting Supreme Court
requires fiduciary duty for 10b-5 liability); Ronald F. Kidd, Insider Trading The
Misappropriation Theory Versus an "Access to Information Perspective, 18 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 101, 112 (1993) (stating "[Slupreme Court held that the duty to disclose 'does not arise
from the mere possession of nonpublic information.' Rather, there must be a relationship
of trust").
90 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 (1980) ("Formulation of such a broad duty, which
departs radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific
relationship between two parties... should not be undertaken absent some explicit
evidence of congressional intent."); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656 (finding Chiarella Court
rejected parity of information theory as inconsistent with congressional intent); see also
Karmel, supra note 18, at 107 (stating common law breach of duty is required for 10b-5
liability to stand); J. Dormer Stephen III, United States v. O'Hagan: The
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Again, the rejection of this theory is evidenced in Dirks.91 In
Dirks, the Court addressed the disclosure or "tipping" of
material, nonpublic information by an insider to an analyst and
expressly rejected the parity of information approach.92 In
reaffirming the holding in Chiarolla, the Court emphasized that
"a duty to disclose arises from the relationship between parties
and not merely from one's ability to acquire information because
of his position in the market."93 The Court discarded the idea
that a person is prohibited from trading whenever he or she
knowingly receives material, nonpublic information from an
insider.94 Instead, the Court stated that a recipient of insider
information is prohibited from trading when the information has
been "improperly 95 made available to him or her as the result of
a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty to shareholders. 96 Under
this formula, courts should use "objective criteria" (e.g. whether
the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the
disclosure) to determine if there has been a breach of duty.97 This
Misappropiation Theory Under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 - Can the Judicial Oak
Grow Any H-igher, 102 DIcK. L. REV. 277, 318 (1998) (asserting Chiare!a did not expand
10b-5 liability to those with no fiduciary relationship because no showing of congressional
intent to expand such liability exists).
91 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654-59 (discussing rejection of parity of information as basis
for liability); see also Dessent, supra note 79, at 1173 (commenting that after Dirks parity
of information theory was "tabled" by the Supreme Court); Hunter & Loviscek, supra note
89, at 110 (finding inability to reach defendant in Dirks was rejection of parity theory);
Kidd, supra note 89, at 106 (noting Supreme Court rejected parity theory in Dirks).
92 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654-59 (requiring breach of fiduciary duty as basis for liability).
See Dessent, supra note 79, at 1173 (discussing parity of information theory after the
Dirks decision); see also Hunter & Loviscek, supra note 89, at 110 (analyzing Supreme
Court rejection of parity theory); Kidd, supra note 89, at 106 (discussing Dirks decision).
93 Dirks, 463 U.S. 657; Dessent, supra note 79, at 1172 (commenting liability based on
fiduciary relationship arose after Dirks); see also Hunter & Loviscek, supra note 89, at 85
(finding Dirks is support for liability based on fiduciary relationship); Kidd, supra note 89,
at 112-14 (noting Supreme Court supports liability based on fiduciary relations).
94 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658-59 (asserting duty to disclose or abstain does not
automatically arise from possession of inside information); see also Dessent, supra note
79, at 1172 (discussing liability based on fiduciary relationship); Hunter & Loviscek,
supra note 89, at 85 (opining Dirks supports liability based on fiduciary relationship).
95 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659-61 (explaining it would open way for "devious" dealings
if outsider recipient receives information improperly obtained from insiders); see also
Dessent, supra note 79, at 1171 (noting tippee must receive information through tipper's
breach of duty and tippee must know duty was breached in order for liability to arise);
Hunter & Loviscek, supra note 89, at 84-85 (noting "tippee of an insider owes a fiduciary
duty that derives from the duty owed by the insider").
96 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659-61 (holding fiduciary duty is owed to shareholders of
corporation by tippee "not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information
to the tippee and the tippee knows or should have known that there has been a breach.");
see also Dessent, supra note 79, at 1171; Hunter & Loviscek, supra note 89, at 84-85.
97 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663; Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg.
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holding virtually eliminated the SEC's ability to combat selective
disclosure via the 10(b)-5 antifraud provision.98 As a result, many
have viewed this decision as affording considerable protection to
insiders who make selective disclosures to analysts, and to the
analysts (and their clients) who receive such information. 99
Since Dirks, there have been very few insider trading cases
involving selective disclosure. 00 While the Supreme Court made
its rejection of the parity of information theory quite clear in both
C iarella and Dirks, it could have done so without great
elaboration. However, the Court chose to question the prudence
of future SEC regulations and warned against adoption of the
parity of information theory absent specific congressional intent.
"It was this halting by the Supreme Court of the SEC's liberal
application of the parity of information theory that contributed
most to the development of the "misappropriation" theory under
10(b)-5."l01
at 51,716, (2000) (to be codified 17 CFR pts. 240, 243, and 249) (discussing how
Regulation FD will address issue of whether analysts who receive inside information are
actually in some way personally benefiting from such information in violation of Dirks).
98 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716 (2000) (noting
Diks left status of "issuer selective disclosure" unclear); see also Banks, supra note 74, at
1 (discussing Regulation FD will address weakness in insider trading laws created by
Dirks); Colesanti, supra note 10, at 14-15 (asserting Dirks was change from SEC's broad
power to enforce lOb-5); Fox, supra note 17, at 663 (positing selective disclosure was
considered legal and normal part of business before Regulation FD); Karmel, supra note
74, at 3 ("[Tlhe SEC was unhappy with its inability to combat selective disclose after
Dirks."); Richards, supra note 15, at 420 (stating Dirksprovided analyst special treatment
under the law).
99 See Colesanti, supra note 10, at 16 ("Commentators would agree that, post-Dirks,
the S.E.C. has demonstrably cooled its jets in terms of charging analysts."); see also Fox,
supra note 17, at 663 (commenting selective disclosure was considered legal and normal
part of business before enactment of Regulation FD); Richards, supra note 15, at 420.
100 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,593
(proposed December 28, 1999) (codified at 17 CFR Parts 240, 243, and 249) ("After Dirks,
there have been very few insider trading cases based on disclosure to, or trading by,
securities analysts."); see also Banks, supra note 74, at 1 ("Since Dirks, the SEC has
brought only two proceedings arising from a corporate insider's selective disclosure of
material nonpublic information to a market professional."); Karmel, supra note 74, at 3
(noting SEC's non-ability to prosecute selective disclosure).
101 See Colesanti, supra note 10, at 15 (discussing Supreme Court's express rejection
of notion that mere possession of material nonpublic information, absent a duty to
shareholders, could create obligation to disclose or abstain); Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,593 (asserting "[in Chiarela, the Court rejected the
'parity of information' approach"); see also Dessent, supra note 79, at 1173 (commenting
that after Dirks parity of information theory was "tabled" by Supreme Court); Hunter &
Loviscek, supra note 89, at 110 (finding inability to reach defendant in Dirks was
rejection of parity theory); Kidd, supra note 89, at 106 (noting Supreme Court rejected
parity theory in Dirks).
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3. Discussion of the "Misappropriation" Theory
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella, the
SEC enacted Rule 14(e)-3 to address the misuse of information in
connection with tender offers.I02 This rule places a "disclose" or
"abstain" prohibition upon any person, other than a bidder or a
prospective bidder in possession of material information
regarding a tender offer.103 In US. v. O'Iagan,10 4 the Supreme
Court endorsed this strategy and the misappropriation theory,
which focuses on a deceptive manner of obtaining nonpublic
information rather than any uniqueness of position. The facts of
the particular case involved an attorney who traded securities of
a target company even though the attorney's law firm
represented the bidder105 According to the Court's holding, the
breach of a duty of loyalty or confidentiality by a fiduciary, which
deprives a principal of the exclusive use of confidential
information, coupled with the self-serving use of that
information, constituted a violation of Rule 10(b)-5.106 Although
the defendant in O'Hagan was held to have violated both Rules
14(e)-3 and 10(b)-5,107 it is unclear whether this holding endorsed
the SEC's view that neither scienter nor a breach of fiduciary
duty is required for a 14(e)-3 violation. 108 In any event, in its
recent release adopting Rules 10(b)-5-1109 and 10(b)-5-2,110 the
SEC acknowledged that courts have definitely rejected the parity
of information theory in insider trading cases that are brought
under 10(b)-5. III Nevertheless, Regulation FD appears to
contradict this conclusion and represents "a return to the parity
102 See Taylor supra note 88, 1333 (asserting Rule 14e-3 is designed to prevent fraud
in connection with tender offers); see also Dessent, supra note 79, at 1167 (noting "[in
apparent retaliation against Cbiareila, four months later the SEC adopted Rule 14e-3");
Karmel, supra note 74, at 3 (positing 14e-3 was adopted after Chiarella "for dealing with
the misuse of information in the tender offer arena").
103 See Karmel, supra note 74, at 3; see also 17 CFR §240.14e-3 (2001).
104 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
105 See id. at 648.
106 See id. at 652-53.; David Cowan Bayne, Insider Trading: Ginsburg's O'-agan:
Insider Trading Ignored, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 423, 427 (1999) (arguing Court adopted
theory that securities laws are violated by "using confidential information
misappropriated in breach of a Fiduciary Duty to the Source").
107 See O'Hagan at 666-67; Bayne, supra note 106, at 436-37 (noting Court merely
affirmed "Commission did not exceed its rulemaking authority in enacting Rule 14e-3(a)").
108 See Karmel, supra note 74, at 3.
109 See 17 CFR §240.lOb5-1 (2001).
110 See 17 CFR §240.10b5-2 (2001).
I11 Karmel, supra note 74, at 3.
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of information theory." "12
B. SEC'S AUTHORITY TO ADOPT REGULA TIONFD UNDER
THE EXCHANGE A CT
The SEC enacted Regulation FD under sections 13(a) and 15(d)
of the Exchange Act.113 Since the language of 13(a) provides the
SEC with broad discretion to proscribe rules and regulations
"necessary or appropriate for the proper protection of investors
and to ensure fair dealing,""14 a plain reading of the section
indicates that the SEC acted within the authority expressly
granted to it by Congress when it promulgated Regulation FD.
The broad language of section 15(d) of the Exchange Act'15 also
gives the SEC wide latitude to enact this regulation. Specifically,
"the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or the protection of investors, such
supplementary and periodic information, documents, and reports
as may be required pursuant to section 13.. . ."116 Since the SEC
expressly states that the purpose of the new regulation is to
protect investors and ensure fair dealing in the market, it is clear
that the Commission acted within its authority to enact
regulation FD under this section. 117
112 Id.
113 See HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 21, (noting Regulation FD is designed
similarly to existing SEC rules under Sections 13(a) and 15(d)).
114 15 U.S.C. 78m (a) (2001).
115 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (c)(4) (2001). See generally Horgan, supra note 11, at 654
(noting issuer must either have securities registered under Section 12 of Exchange Act or
must be required to file reports under Section 15 (d) of Exchange Act to be subject to
Regulation FD.); Jennings, supra note 9, at 580 (stating Regulation FD creates duties
only under Section 13 (a) and Section 15 (d) of Exchange Act).
116 15 U.S.C. §78o (d) (2001).
117 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (2000) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249) (noting selective disclosure of material
information by issuers leads to loss of investor confidence in integrity of capital markets.);
see also Fox, supra note 17, at 684 (stating SEC claims primary purpose of Regulation FD
is to provide "fundamental fairness to all investors."); Jennings, supra note 9, at 547
(2001) (noting Regulation FD is intended to level playing field between those parties privy
to material nonpublic information before its public dissemination and those who are not).
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III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: POTENTIAL NEGATIVE
IMPACTS
A. "CHILLING EFFECT"
Although Regulation FD's stated purpose is to improve the flow
of information into the marketplace,1 8 the new rule may actually
increase market volatility and reduce the quantity and quality of
information reaching the marketplace. 119 One major concern with
the new regulation is that there is no specific mandate for
company disclosures.120 Rather, Regulation FD simply states that
if an issuer chooses to disclose material, nonpublic information to
someone it must simultaneously release that information to the
public.121 Determining such materiality is often difficult and
risky, potentially making corporate officials less inclined to
discuss important information at all.122 This scenario highlights
118 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,717-18
(explaining need for Regulation FD); see also Jennings, supra note 9, at 567 (discussing
Regulation FD's stated purpose evidences SEC's desire to combat selective disclosure of
material nonpublic information by company officials to securities market professionals).
See generally Richards, supra note 15, at 420 (stating SEC proposed Regulation FD to
eliminate seemingly special treatment afforded to analysts by Dirks decision).
119 See Kramer, supra note 5, at A23 (arguing three unintended but likely results of
Regulation FD include less information in the markets, more stock price volatility, and
increased need for high-priced legal advice); see also Analysts, Portfolio Managers Say
Volume, Quality of Informaton Have Fallen Under Regulation FD, AIM Member
Survey Shows, BUSINESS WIRE, Mar. 26, 2001 (discussing survey concluding volume of
substantive information released by public companies has decreased since Regulation FD
took effect). See generally Charles Davidson, Putting Shoe Leather to Asphalt, NATIONAL
REAL ESTATE INVESTOR, Sept. 2001 (analyzing view Regulation FD is causing companies
to clam up and disclose less information).
120 See Lubna Kably, Selective Disclosure, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, Aug. 25, 2000
(arguing SEC's proposals do not direct specific company disclosures); see also Egan, supra
note 5, at C4 (criticizing Regulation FD for allowing SEC to bring enforcement actions
against public companies that selectively disclose material information to analysts and
investors before disclosing it publicly, without offering any guidance on what constitutes
material information). See generally Letter from Thomas A. Bowmen & Arthur Zeikel,
Association for Investment Management and Research, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Re: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading
(File No. S7-31-99), (Apr. 26, 2000), (available at
http:/AvwTv.sec.gov/rulespioposeds73199/zeikell.htm) (discussing unanswered questions
of liability under Regulation FD).
121 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716 (discussing
basic rules of Regulation FD); see also Horgan, supra note 11, at 660 (clarifying issuer
must make simultaneous public disclosure when disclosure is intentional). See generally
Colesanti, supra note 10, at 6 (2000) (explaining requirements of Regulation FD).
122 See Norm Alster, Tight lips sink stock tips; Has Regulation FD had a chilling
effect on the flow of information from public companies ELECTRONIC BUSINESS, July 1,
2001 at 56 (arguing companies fearful of SEC prosecution will starting blocking news);
see also Jennings, supra note 9, at 596 (stating when question arises whether company
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the potential danger of creating a "chilling effect" on corporate
communications by slowing the information flow if issuers decide
not to disclose anything at all, rather than make a mistake and
subject themselves to liability.123
As previously discussed, the SEC failed to offer a bright-line
test to assist issuers in determining materiality.124 As a result, it
is often unclear to issuers what type of information would be
considered material. 25 Without such standards, an issuer will be
at risk of violating Regulation FD when speaking in a nonpublic
forum, regardless of their earlier materiality assessments. 26 By
inhibiting contacts with analysts, Regulation FD could result in
less, rather than more disclosure to the securities markets.127 In
fact, there seems to be some early evidence that companies
may selectively disclose information, company will likely err on side of caution and keep
information confidential). See generally Egan, supra note 5, at C4 (arguing most well-
counseled companies are careful not to discuss material information).
123 See Daniel L. Goelzer, SEC 'Fair Disclosure" Proposal Can Chili Market
Communications, LEGAL OPINION LETMER, Mar. 17, 2000 at Vol. 10 No. 6 (arguing
proposed Regulation FD makes selective disclosure strict liability offense resulting in less
disclosure to securities markets); see also Jennings, supra note 9, at 596 (discussing view
Regulation FD will have chilling effect on corporate disclosures resulting from fear
company will run afoul of Regulation FD); Peloso & Indek, supra note 5, at 3 (noting
major criticism of Proposed Regulation FD; it would have effect exactly opposite of
Commission's intent, i.e., to increase public disclosure of material information about
issuer).
124 See Jennings, supra note 9, at 598 (stating SEC failed to provide "bright line" test
as to what information qualifies as material under Regulation FD); see also Alster, supra
note 122, at 56 (discussing confusion over definition of material information under
Regulation FD). See generally Bowmen & Zeikel, supra note 120 (discussing materiality
under Regulation FD).
125 See Colesanti, supra note 10, at 22-23 ("Regulation FD suffers from its undefined
terms including 'materiality,' 'nonpublic,' and 'broad, non-exclusionary' public disclosure");
Egan, supra note 5, at C4 (discussing new rule does not offer any guidance on what
constitutes "material information"). But see Horgan, supra note 11, at 656-57 ("[t]he
Commission rejected the suggestion of including a bright line standard, but, in response
to requests for more interpretive guidance, set forth a list of the types of information it
believes are especially likely to be considered material").
126 See Bowmen & Zeikel, supra note 120 (stating broad definition of "materiality"
will have a negative impact on non-public corporate communications); see also Colesanti,
supra note 10, at 22-23 (discussing the vague language used in Regulation FD). But see
Jennings, supra note 9, at 568 (2001) ("Regulation FD imposes an affirmative duty to
disclose material nonpublic information that is intended to be communicated to
designated market professionals.").
127 See Bowmen & Zeikel, supra note 120 (stating "[in fact, we are very concerned
that the proposed regulations, rather than increase the information flow to investors, will
curtail that flow because issuers will take the line of least resistance and disclose less");
Goelzer, supra note 123, at Vol. 10 No. 6 (noting regulations on market information to
analysts can have adverse effect on all information disclosed by companies). But see John
Hackett, Facing Up to Broad Disclosure, U.S. BANKER, Dec. 2000, at 51 (commenting
banks are changing way corporate information is released by using internet and
conference calls to let anyone listen in on discussions with analysts).
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intend to reduce the amount of information they release to the
marketplace. 128 Further, companies are hesitant to be the first to
test the breadth of the materiality term.1 29
An increase in market volatility is a real and tangible result of
this lack of information. 3 0 In a survey conducted by Thomson
Financial, 100 percent of the companies said they expected the
volatility of their stock to increase because of Regulation FD.13'
This volatility can be attributed to a company being less able to
guide analysts' estimates.1 32 Perhaps the clearest evidence of this
increased potential for volatility can be found in Intel's release of
information in compliance with Regulation FD even before the
new rule had become effective.133 In an attempt to comply with
the rule, Intel issued a news release rather than simply
informing influential analysts when it realized that its third
quarter revenues would fall short of the expected figures.134 On
128 See Beth Piskora, New SEC Rule Unnerves Market N.Y. POST, Oct. 23, 2000, at
52 (commenting Regulation RD might decrease amount of information released by
companies); see also Colesanti, supra note 10, at 16 (stating in mid-1990's concern over
abusive litigation by SEC and Congress had chilled disclosure by corporations); Richards,
supra note 15, at 437-439 (discussing potential caution in communicating with analysts
because of liability for releasing information).
129 See David Lyons, Insider Trading, BROWARD DAILY BUSINESS REV., Nov. 1, 2000,
at Al (noting companies do not want to become "guinea pig" for how materiality becomes
interpreted).
130 See Piskora, supra note 128, at 52 (stating Wall Street analysts believe the new
SEC Regulation will result in less company information released to both analysts and
investors alike); Bowmen & Zeikel, supra note 120 (expressing concern Regulation FD will
result in decreased information flow to investors). But see Hackett, supra note 127, at 51
(discussing new methods by which banks are releasing corporate information).
131 See Piskora, supra note 128, at 52 (discussing results of survey conducted by
Thomson Financial).
132 See Piskora, supra note 128, at 52 (attributing increased volatility of market to
companies' decreased role in guiding analyst's estimates). See generally Jennings, supra
note 9, at 551 (discussing how company is protecting its best interest by contributing to
accuracy of analysts' reports); Get Ready for the Regulation FD Shakedown Cruise, PR
NEWS, Sept. 11, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4139083 (explaining how companies will
often review drafts of analyst reports in order to make sure of their accuracy).
133 See Daniel Gross, A Little Democracy on Wall Street, NY TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000, at
A25 (discussing Inters news release of its third-quarters revenue falling short of estimate,
and repercussions that followed); Hackett, supra note 127, at 51 (discussing how critics'
predictions of Regulation FD's affect on increased volatility of stock prices came true
when Intel issued its press release of third-quarter revenues falling short of expectations);
Joseph Nocera, No Whispering Allowed; Why the SEC's Crackdown on Selective
Disclosure is Good News, MONEY, Dec. 2000, at 71 (noting Seth Tobias' statement of how
Intel's pre-announcement last September is example of "how much worse a Regulation FD
world will be").
134 See Gross, supra note 133, at A25 (discussing Intel's news release, as opposed to
disclosing to only a few influential analysts); Hackett, supra note 127, at 51 (stating
"Intel's press release announcing that earnings estimates would fall short of expectations"
was for early compliance with Regulation FD). But see Nocera, supra note 133, at 71
(stating Intel has traditionally released market-sensitive information to all investors at
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the following day, investors of all sizes rushed to dump their
shares; Intel fell 22 percent and suffered an $80 million loss as a
record 300 million shares traded hands.135 Similarly, when Dell,
Apple, Hasbro, United Airlines and Xerox issued public warnings
about lower than expected earnings, the stock of these market-
leading "Blue Chip" companies also plummeted.136 Surely, such
volatility can lead to decreased public confidence in the securities
markets.
B. "INFORMATION OVERLOAD"
Ironically, another potential negative impact of the new
regulation is the opposite scenario, where the proposal results in
significantly greater information being made available to the
public in an "information overload."'137 Such information overload
is likely caused by the same lack of clarity in the materiality
definition138 that was previously discussed. Even though
Regulation FD simply calls for the disclosure of material
information, 139 some issuers may decide to err on the side of
same time).
135 See Gross, supra note 133, at A25 (discussing negative results such disclosure had
on firm's stock price and trade volume); Hackett, supra note 127, at 51 (stating because of
such disclosure "[tihe next day the stock lost 20% of its value"); Nocera, supra note 133, at
71 (noting "[i]mmediately after the pre-announcement, the stock dropped a stomach-
churning 22%").
136 See Gross, supra note 133, at A25 (showing similar results to other publicly traded
companies that also disclosed public warnings); see also Thomas G. Donlan, Phony
Fairness: Regulation FD Will Hurt Markets and Investors, BARRON'S, Oct. 23, 2000, at 78
(discussing how markets have already seen companies complying with Regulation FD and
are getting hit with 10% and 20% price declines in single day); Aram Fuchs, Regulation
FD Good for the Marke4 UPSIDE TODAY, Dec. 19, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4726628
(stating "[clompanies that have disseminated information directly to the public have seen
their stock price plummet after the release").
137 See Laura S. Unger, Rethinking Disclosure in the Information Age: Can There be
too Much of a Good Thing, Address before the Internet Securities Regulation American
Conference Institute, (June 26, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch387.htm (discussing adverse effects that too much
information may have on market). But see Horgan, supra note 11, at 664-65 (stating
market is fully efficient when price of security embodies all information whether such
information is publicly available or not); Jennings, supra note 9, at 549 (stating full
disclosure of all information represents one of guiding principles of federal securities
regulation).
138 See Colesanti, supra note 10, at 22-23 (stating "Regulation FD suffers from its
undefined terms including 'materiality,' 'nonpublic,' and 'broad, non-exclusionary' public
disclosure"); Egan, supra note 5, at C4 (discussing how new rule does not offer any
guidance on what constitutes "material information"). But see Horgan, supra note 11, at
656-57 (stating "[tihe Commission rejected the suggestion of including a bright line
standard, but, in response to requests for more interpretive guidance, set forth a list of
the types of information it believes are especially likely to be considered material").
139 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (2000) (to be
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caution by disclosing both material and nonmaterial
information.140 Although too much information may be preferable
to not having enough, Regulation FD could produce an
overwhelming flow of information if companies address the
materiality issue by releasing information concerning everything
and anything. 14 1
Prior to Regulation FD's adoption, the job of the analyst was to
"ferret out" the important information and present it to the
public.1 42 Under an information overload scenario, where average
public investors are inundated with information without the
benefit of professional assistance, the inability to properly
analyze the information may result in trading on false
expectations. 43 Information can only empower investors if they
can understand and effectively apply it. 144 Further, access to
information can never be a substitute for knowing how to
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249).
140 See Unger, supra note 137. See generally Machmeier, supra note 24, 3D
(discussing adverse effects of disclosing all information to the public); Reg. FD Could
Swamp Investors, SEC's Unger Says, INVESTORS RELATIONS BUSINESS, Aug. 14, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 8692594 (discussing SEC Commissioner Laura Unger's statements
about effects of disclosing too much information to public).
141 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716; Machmeier,
supra note 24, at 3D (discussing how flow of too much information to average investor can
have an opposite effect than regulation intends); see also Reg. FD Could Swamp
Investors, SEC's Unger Says, INVESTORS RELATIONS BUSINESS, Aug. 14, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 8692594 (discussing SEC Commissioner Laura Unger's statement that "an
equally likely problem could be that investors become swamped with too much
information").
142 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646 (stating common role for analyst was to search out
information by meeting with and questioning corporate officers and other insiders); see
also Gross, supra note 133, at A25 (describing analysts as "well-dressed but passive
conduits"); Jennings, supra note 9, at 550 (stating corporate disclosure often results in
unintelligible public information even to experienced investors and as a result securities
analyst acts as intermediary between markets and potential investors).
143 See Martin H. Dozier, Note, Baring's Ghost: Item 305 in SEC Regulation S-K and
"Market Risk" Disclosure of Financial Derivatives, 34 GA. L. REV. 1417, 1460-65 (2000)
(noting potential to mislead investors by disclosure of too much information); Laura S.
Unger, Rethinking Disclosure in the Information Age: Can There Be Too Much of a Good
Thing, Address Before the Internet Securities Regulation American Conference Institute
(June 26, 2000) (questioning whether investors will require professional assistance) at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch387.htm; see also SEC Special Study: On-Line
Brokerage: Keeping Apace of Cyberspace, 67 (Nov. 22, 1999) (noting investors may be
unsure of how to properly utilize information) athttpJ/www.sec.gov/pdf/cybrtrnd.pdf.
144 See Unger, supra note 137 (concluding access to information is only one part of
investing picture), at httpY4/w-w.sec.gov/news/speech/spch387.htm; see also SEC Investor
Alert: Analyzing Analysts Recommendations, (July 13, 2001) (urging investors to conduct
their won research before trading on recommendations) at
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm; SEC Special Study: On-Line Brokerage:
Keeping Apace of Cyberspace , (Nov. 22, 1999) (describing importance of investor
education) athttp://www.sec.gov/news/studies/cyberspace.htm.
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interpret it. 145 As more information gets directly into the hands
of investors, it seems more appropriate than ever that analysts
and other professionals should continue to play an important role
in giving meaning to the facts. 146
C. "PARITY OFINFORMA TION"ASAN UNREALISTIC GOAL
At the end of the day, equal access to all material information
is likely an unattainable goal. 4 7 "Even if there is an absolute,
theoretical compliance with a Regulation FD, some [investors]
will inevitably get the information and act on it sooner than
others."148 For example, the investor who is watching the first
screen on which the information appears will always have an
advantage over those who do get their information from another
source. 149 Investors following their stocks at the office will have
an advantage, including the ability to trade immediately, over
those who wait until they get home from work.150 Similarly,
145 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 (stating one role of analysts is to "ferret out and
analyze information"); see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at
51,717 (stating information will still need to be interpreted by analysts); Unger, supra
note 137 (noting market professionals will still fill important role for investors) at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch387.htm.
146 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-58 (rejecting idea of equality of information); see also
Peloso & Indek, supra note 5, at 3 (suggesting Regulation FD would necessitate
disclosure far beyond what is currently required); Lee B. Spencer, Jr. & George A.
Schieren, Letter to the Jonathan G. Katz, Re: Proposed Regulation FD - File No. S7-31-
99, Securities Industry Association 8, (Apr. 6, 2000) (stating required access to all
information would be departure from current securities law) at
http://vwww.sia.com/2OOO_ comment letters/dfsec-regulationjfd4-6.pdf.
147 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-58 (rejecting idea of equality of information); see also
Peloso & Indek, supra note 5, at 3 (suggesting Regulation FD would necessitate disclosure
far beyond what is currently required); Spencer & Schieren, supra note 146, at 8.
148 See Spencer, & Schieren, supra note 146, at 8; see also Jason Michael Craft, Note,
What's All the Commotion?" An Examination of the Securities and Exchange
Commission's Regulation FD, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 119, 121 (2001) (noting selective
disclosure results in information being released to analysts before general public); T.
Andrew Eckstein, supra note 20, at 1291 (discussing SEC's concern that analysts may
receive information before small investors and reap benefits from it at others' expense);
Hayday, supra note 23, at 844 (noting small investors' access to information may lag
behind analysts' access by a few days).
149 See Kramer, supra note 5, at A23 (commenting Regulation FD might actually
restrict disclosure); Spencer & Schieren, supra note 146, at 4 (noting limited number of
infractions). But see Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590,
72,591-92 (proposed Dec. 28, 2000) (noting numerous recent examples of selective
disclosure practices).
150 See Fox, supra note 17, at 663 (commenting most evidence of selective disclosure
occurs in press reports); Peloso & Indek, supra note 5, at 3 (noting many commentators
feel Regulation FD is unnecessary). But see Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65
Fed. Reg. at 51,717 (rejecting view Regulation FD is unnecessary due to scarce evidence of
selective disclosure).
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"investors monitoring electronic communications will have an
advantage over those who get the news over radio and TV."I1
The methods for disclosure under Regulation FD fall prey to
similar problems.
For example, conference calls appear to be a less than
adequate means for insuring that all investors have realistic
access to disclosed information.152 Consequently, those who
participate in a conference call will essentially be in a similar
position as those who were the beneficiaries of selective
disclosure prior to the enactment of Regulation FD.153 Internet
web casting introduces the same problems because each person
who is able to log in and access the disclosed information will
enjoy an informational advantage over those who cannot. 54
Thus, although SEC through Regulation FD attempts to level the
playing field for all investors, it may well be grasping at an
unachievable goal.155
151 See Spencer, & Schieren, supra note 146, at 8; see also Peloso & Indek, supra note
5, at 3 (noting lack of studies and relevant data). But see Securities Industry Association
Study, Costs and Benefits of Regulation FD 3-5, (May 18, 2001) (summarizing effects of
Regulation FD), at http://www.sia.com/reg-fd/pdf/RegFD.pdf; SEC Special Study, Online
Brokerage: Keeping Apace of Cyberspace,55-57 (Nov. 22, 1999) (noting the increasing role
internet will play in disseminating market data to investors), at
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/cybrtrnd.pdf.
152 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592
(proposed Dec. 20, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, and 249) (noting
problems when conference calls are opened only to insiders and exclude investing public);
see also Richards, supra note 15, at 418-19 (noting selective disclosure can occur in
conference calls from which small investors are excluded); Randall Smith, Conference
Calls to Big Investors Often Leave Little Guys Hung Up, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1995, at
Cl (noting conference calls are more advantageous to large investors than small
investors).
153 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,591 (noting issuer
controls to whom disclosure will be made); Steinberg, supra note 44, at 655-56 (noting
issuers cannot rely on a single disclosure method to satisfy Regulation FD). But cf Lance
Myers, Regulation of Securities and Security Exchanges in the Age of the Internet:
Regulation FD and Private Trading on the Internet: Keeping Pace with Constant Change,
5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLy 15, 17-18 (2001/2002) (reviewing ways in which issuers
can comply with SEC guidelines to make conference calls more open).
154 See Eckstein, supra note 20, at 1297 (noting SEC's requirement that webcasts are
preceded by adequate public notice and means to access webcast); Hayday, supra note 23,
at 858 (noting lack of internet access will prohibit some investors from accessing
webcasts); see also Peter H. Ehrenberg & Peter S. Friedman, To Speak or Not to Speak:
Selective Disclosure and Regulation FD, 203 N.J. LAW. 23, 26 (June 2000) (stating not all
investors have computer access).
155 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (August
24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249) (noting individual investors'
concern over selective disclosure and advantage it gives to analysts); see also Spencer &
Schieren, supra note 146, at 10 (characterizing parity of information as "illusory"), Unger,
supra note 137 (discussing one goal of Regulation FD is to achieve balance between
interests of individual investors and corporations regarding disclosure).
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D. INDUSTRY TREND MA YRENDER RULE UNNECESSARY
Some commentators have argued that Regulation FD is simply
a hastily-drafted response to a perceived problem, which actually
exists in very few real-world situations. 156 In fact, the SEC's
assertion of the existence of a problem associated with selective
disclosure appears to be based primarily upon anecdotal
evidence, 1 57 since there is an absence of any study evaluating the
consequences of Regulation FD.158 To the contrary, recent data
compiled by the National Investor Relations Institute already
showed a dramatic trend toward opening up quarterly conference
calls to the public well before the SEC enacted Regulation FD.159
Clearly, this is just one area where there was an ongoing change
towards greater transparency and openness.160 The Internet also
continues to create a "powerful, investor-driven pressure toward
more open discussions of forward-looking information." 161 It can
be argued that this trend would have likely continued even in the
absence of a new rule, thanks to investor demand for real time
access to information, and the proliferation of technology to
provide that information instantly and inexpensively. 162
156 See Kramer, supra note 5, at A23 (commenting Regulation FD might actually
restrict disclosure); Spencer & Schieren, supra note 146, at 4 (noting limited number of
infractions). But see Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Fed. Reg. at 72,591-92
(noting numerous recent examples of selective disclosure practices).
157 See Fox, supra note 17, at 663 (noting most evidence of selective disclosure occurs
in press reports); Peloso & Indek, supra note 5, at 3 (discussing the feeling among many
commentators that Regulation FD is unnecessary). But see Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, supra note 1, at 51,717 (rejecting view that Regulation FD is
unnecessary).
158 See Peloso & Indek, supra note 5, at 3 (noting lack of scientific data). But see
Securities Industry Association Study, Costs and Benefits of Regulation FD 3-5 (May 18,
2001) at http://www.sia.com/reg-fd/pdf/RegFD.pdf; SEC Special Study, Online Brokerage:
Keeping Apace of Cyberspace 55-57 (Nov. 22, 1999) (noting increasing role internet will
play in disseminating market data to investors), athttp://www.sec.gov/pdflcybrtrnd.pdf.
159 See Kramer, supra note 5, at A23 (noting many companies make their conference
calls available publicly); Spencer & Schieren, supra note 146, at 3-4 (noting NIRI survey
indicates trend of allowing greater open access for investors); see also Regulation FD: Has
the SEC Cut the Tightrope, BUSINESS LINE (Dec. 3, 2000) (noting 61% of issuers
currently webcast and 22% plan to do so), available at 2000 WL 30107443.
160 See Spencer & Schieren, supra note 146, at 3 (noting general increase in
information being made available.
161 See Kramer, supra note 5, atA23.
162 See Spencer & Schieren, supra note 146, at 4 (noting companies were already
moving towards open disclosure prior to Regulation FD enactment); Louis M. Thompson,
Executive Alert, Guidance For Compliance with Regulation FD, National Investor
Relations Institute, (Sept. 10, 2001) (discussing September 2001 NIRI survey that found
92% of members webcasting conference calls), at
http://www.niri.org/publications/alerts/EA091001.cfm; Unger, supra note 137 (discussing
impact of technology on investors in future).
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Ironically, the new regulation may be responsible for placing a
halt on this trend, thus leaving the SEC further from its goal
than when it began.163
IV. CONCLUSION
Admittedly, unregulated selective disclosure, could eventually
lead some investors to question fairness and integrity in the
marketplace. However we have crafted this note in an attempt to
explore several concerns about Regulation FD's enactment and
its potential impact on the securities markets. Specifically, the
new regulation became effective with limited treatment of recent
Supreme Court decisions and the intent of Congress in adopting
the Exchange Act of 1934. As mentioned, although the Supreme
Court expressly rejected the parity of information theory in
Chiarella and Dirks, it appears that the SEC adopted Regulation
FD under the provisions of 13(a) and 15(d) of the 1934 Exchange
Act in order to avoid potential conflicting with Supreme Court
language. Further, the court said in Chiarella and repeated in
Dirks, that the SEC should not undertake "formulation of an
absolute equal information rule.. . 'absent some explicit evidence
of congressional intent."'1 64 While Congress has never expressly
rejected the parity of information theory in quite the same way, it
is impossible to ignore the protection that Congress has afforded
market analysts throughout the 1934 Exchange Act. This
protection suggests that the SEC's authority is not so clearly
defined in this area and perhaps a more careful consideration
should have been undertaken before enacting Regulation FD.
Finally, even if clear authority existed for the SEC to enact
Regulation FD, the existence of potentially adverse policy
implications such as a chilling effect on communications and,
163 See Colesanti, supra note 10, at 30-31 (concluding Regulation FD brings
uncertainty to disclosure rules); Spencer & Schieren, supra note 146, at 44 (concluding
Regulation FD will lead to less disclosure). But see Thompson, supra note 162 (finding
most members of National Investor Relations Institute are releasing same amount or
more information than before Regulation FD took effect).
164 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657 n.16 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233
(1980)); see also Lee B. Spencer, Jr. & Stuart J. Kaswell, Letter to the Honorable Isaac C.
Hunt, Jr., Securities Industry Association 1 (June 13, 2000) (noting Regulation FD
disregards Supreme Court's warning in Dirks against equal information rule), at
http://www.sia.com/2000_commentletters/
pdf/hunt.pdf; Spencer & Schieren, supra note 147, at 8-9 (arguing SEC lacks authority for
disclosures proposed in Regulation FD).
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conversely, an information overload for investors perhaps make
it clear that a more careful study should have been undertaken
before the adoption of the regulation.
